Remuneration of primary dental care in England:A qualitative framework analysis of perspectives of a new service delivery model incorporating incentives for improved access, quality and health outcomes by Robinson, Peter G. et al.
                          Robinson, P. G., Douglas, G., Gibson, B., Godson, J., Vinall-Collier, K.,
Pavitt, S., & Hulme, C. (2019). Remuneration of primary dental care in
England: A qualitative framework analysis of perspectives of a new service
delivery model incorporating incentives for improved access, quality and
health outcomes. BMJ Open, 9(10), [e031886].
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
License (if available):
CC BY-NC
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the final published version of the article (version of record). It first appeared online via BMJ at
https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/9/10/e031886. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms
1Robinson PG, et al. BMJ Open 2019;9:e031886. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2019-031886
Open access 
Remuneration of primary dental care in 
England: a qualitative framework 
analysis of perspectives of a new service 
delivery model incorporating incentives 
for improved access, quality and 
health outcomes
Peter G Robinson,1 Gail V A Douglas,2 Barry J Gibson,3 Jenny Godson,2,4 
Karen Vinall-Collier,2 Sue Pavitt,2 Claire Hulme5
To cite: Robinson PG, 
Douglas GVA, Gibson BJ, et al.  
Remuneration of primary 
dental care in England: 
a qualitative framework 
analysis of perspectives of a 
new service delivery model 
incorporating incentives for 
improved access, quality and 
health outcomes. BMJ Open 
2019;9:e031886. doi:10.1136/
bmjopen-2019-031886
 ► Prepublication history for 
this paper is available online. 
To view these files, please visit 
the journal online (http:// dx. doi. 
org/ 10. 1136/ bmjopen- 2019- 
031886).
Received 29 May 2019
Revised 16 August 2019
Accepted 21 August 2019
For numbered affiliations see 
end of article.
Correspondence to
Dr Claire Hulme;  
 C. T. Hulme@ exeter. ac. uk
Original research
© Author(s) (or their 
employer(s)) 2019. Re-use 
permitted under CC BY-NC. No 
commercial re-use. See rights 
and permissions. Published by 
BMJ.
Strengths and limitations of this study
 ► While participant numbers are modest, staff were 
purposively sampled across a range of skill mix so 
similar numbers were observed.
 ► Patients and ‘non-patients’ were recruited—the lat-
ter to include people who may not engage with local 
dental care services.
 ► There will inevitably be a degree of bias given that 
all the practices were self-selected.
 ► The model of access was broadly sustained in the 
data but might be enhanced by greater conceptual 
clarity.
 ► Although the new practices increased access, fur-
ther work is required to understand how best to 
promote and encourage appropriate dental service 
attendance.
AbStrACt
Objective This study aimed to describe stakeholder 
perspectives of a new service delivery model in primary 
care dentistry incorporating incentives for access, quality 
and health outcomes.
Design Data were collected through observations, 
interviews and focus groups.
Setting This was conducted under six UK primary dental 
care practices, three working under the incentive-driven 
contract and three working under the traditional activity-
based contract.
Participants Observations were made of 30 dental 
appointments. Eighteen lay people, 15 dental team staff 
and a member of a commissioning team took part in the 
interviews and focus groups.
results Using a qualitative framework analysis informed 
by Andersen’s model of access, we found oral health 
assessments influenced patients’ perceptions of need, 
which led to changes in preventive behaviour. Dentists 
responded to the contract, with greater emphasis on 
prevention, use of the disease risk ratings in treatment 
planning, adherence to the pathways and the utilisation of 
skill-mix. Participants identified increases in the capacity 
of practices to deliver more care as a result. These 
changes were seen to improve evaluated and perceived 
health and patient satisfaction. These outcomes fed back 
to shape people’s predispositions to visit the dentist.
Conclusion The incentive-driven contract was perceived 
to increase access to dental care, determine dentists’ and 
patients’ perceptions of need, their behaviours, health 
outcomes and patient satisfaction. Dentists face challenges 
in refocusing care, perceptions of preventive dentistry, 
deployment of skill mix and use of the risk assessments and 
care pathways. Dentists may need support in these areas 
and to recognise the differences between caring for individual 
patients and the patient-base of a practice.
IntrODuCtIOn
Commissioning of National Health Service 
(NHS) dentistry in England is moving away 
from volume-based contracts with payment 
for units of dental activity (UDA) to an 
approach that rewards quality and oral health 
improvement alongside activity.1 Payments 
recognise prevention and reward the contri-
bution of the dental team to improved oral 
health, reflected in patient progression 
along care pathways, adherence to nationally 
agreed clinical guidelines and the achieve-
ment of expected outcomes.1 The Depart-
ment of Health and Social Care (DHSC) 
dental contract reform programme opened 
a series of pilots in 2011, subsequently 
followed by ongoing prototype systems, to 
explore a shift from treatment and repair 
to prevention and improved oral health via 
a new clinical pathway and new remuner-
ation models.2 3 While the impact of these 
contracts on process has been investigated, 
limited evidence exists on their effect on oral 
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health outcomes and patient, commissioner and work-
force acceptability.
The care pathway in the pilots and prototypes begins 
with an oral health assessment (OHA)3 4 designed to 
enable more prevention within personalised care plans, 
taking into account patients’ social and dental histories 
and clinical status. Patients are then advised of their oral 
risk status using a red/amber/green (RAG) rating, given 
preventive advice and a follow-up or review based on 
their risk status. The RAG tool allows dentists to perform 
detailed and consistent assessments that, in turn, direct 
delivery of care appropriate to needs and aids commu-
nication with patients. Evaluation of the pilots reported 
patient and practitioners’ views of the new clinical 
pathway to be strongly supportive.5 However, evidence on 
the effectiveness of use of contracting and incentives in 
health providers is still emerging and is mixed.6–9 Within 
dentistry, changes to incentive structures towards a fee for 
service model increased activity and influenced dentists 
to target UDAs by shifting towards treatments with high 
rewards rather than prescribing on the basis of need.10 11 
However, a recent review found low-level evidence and 
concluded that changes to remuneration may change 
clinical activity in primary care dentistry but further 
experimental research is needed.12 Furthermore, there is 
little literature regarding care pathways in primary dental 
care.13 Findings from the national dental contract pilots 
suggested small improvements in risk reduction over 
the short term.14 The new prototypes are undergoing 
evaluation.14
Another potential advantage of a new dental contract 
would be more effective use of skill mix. Dental hygien-
ists/therapists may provide treatments such as scaling and 
polishing, oral health promotion, fissure sealants and 
fillings on all patients and pulp treatment/stainless steel 
crowns and extractions on children. The potential contri-
bution of dental therapists to reduce costs and increase 
access to care is considerable. While there are few hard 
data to support skill mix in dentistry,15 approximately 
60%–70% of dentists are prepared to consider employing 
a therapist, although some dentists remain unclear of 
their roles.16–18
In 2007, a new incentive-driven contract (INCENTIVE) 
intended to promote evidence-based preventive interven-
tions, widen access to dentistry and encourage the use of 
skill mix (skill mix in dentistry describes a model which 
might include, for example, dentists, dental therapists, 
dental hygienists and dental nurses) was introduced in 
three primary care dental practices in West Yorkshire. 
The practices were in areas of high oral health need and 
with high demand for NHS dental care. While it predated 
the national dental contract pilots and prototypes, the 
specification of the INCENTIVE model reflected the 
same ethos and recommendations, with several features 
identical. Like the prototypes, the INCENTIVE model 
blended incentives to demonstrate quality, oral health 
improvements and volume of service. Most of its contract 
value (60%) was attributed to the delivery of UDAs, with 
the remainder equally divided between quality (including 
systems, processes and infrastructure) and oral health 
improvement via implementation of Delivering Better 
Oral Health.19 The model also employed the same OHA 
care pathway.
Our overall aim was to evaluate the incentive-driven 
model of dental service provision implemented in West 
Yorkshire in the North of England. Our objectives were 
to (1) explore stakeholder perspectives of the new service 
delivery model, (2) assess its effectiveness and (3) assess 
its cost-effectiveness. This manuscript reports on the first 
objective; details of the effectiveness and cost-effective-
ness evaluation can be found elsewhere.20 21
MethODS
This qualitative study focused on the three INCENTIVE 
practices and three comparator dental practices working 
under traditional UDA contracts (TRADITIONAL prac-
tices). The TRADITIONAL were matched with the 
INCENTIVE practices by deprivation index, age profile, 
size of practice and ethnicity.
Data were collected in focus groups and semistructured 
interviews, supplemented with observations of dental 
appointments of the delivery of dental care. Purposive 
sampling via a sampling matrix supported recruitment of 
participants with different experiences of the model. The 
three stakeholders groups were lay people (patients and 
non-patients), dental teams (dental practitioners, dental 
care professionals and practice managers) and a service 
commissioner. The sampling matrix for the public and 
patient group included criteria linked to demographic 
factors (age, gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status), risk 
category and treatment need.
Encounters were observed in two INCENTIVE and 
two TRADITIONAL practices. Staff were sampled so 
that similar numbers (15 each) of dentists and dental 
hygienist/therapists were observed. All eligible adult 
patients (18 years or older) with appointments on the 
observation day were invited to participate. Two weeks 
before their appointments, patients were sent a letter 
informing them of the study, a study information leaflet 
and consent form. Patients who expressed interest in 
participating were given the opportunity to ask any ques-
tions and give consent on the day of their appointment. 
The ‘non-participant’ observer (a researcher whose 
background lies in sociology) attended all appointments 
passively at a distance close enough to hear the conversa-
tion to take comprehensive field notes. A brief analysis of 
observations was conducted as soon as possible after the 
observation (the same or following day).
Observations were followed by interviews on the same 
day with four dentists and four dental hygienists/ther-
apists. Staff commented on the encounters and shared 
their views on what had taken place. Questions asked 
at the post-observation interview were influenced by 
the nature of the activity in the encounters, the team 
member’s attitude, expectations and impressions, and 
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Figure 1 Andersen’s behavioural model of access (adapted 
from Baker26).
reflections of the experience. Interviews were recorded 
and transcribed verbatim.
Interviews were also conducted with patients, other lay 
people, commissioners and dental team members. Lay 
people were recruited in two ways: (1) practices mailed 
information packs to patients; (2) focus groups were held 
with groups attending a community centre, including 
one for parents with young children and another for 
older residents. In addition, snowball sampling entailed 
existing participants passing the study information and 
the researcher’s contact details on to acquaintances. 
Participants should be aged 16 years and older. People 
with no natural teeth were excluded.
Interviews and focus groups followed a topic guide, 
partly informed by the theoretical framework and supple-
mented with themes that emerged from the observations 
and previous interviews. Interviews with dental team 
members took place at the dental surgery, while inter-
views with patients took place in patients’ homes. All were 
recorded and transcribed verbatim. Interviews lasted 
between 15 and 70 min.
The Andersen behavioural model of access was 
employed as the theoretical framework for the qualita-
tive analysis (figure 1). The model sees access as ‘the use of 
personal health services and everything that facilitates or impedes 
their use’.22
The model has evolved in line with advances in under-
standing to incorporate the interaction between indi-
vidual, healthcare system and external environment.22–24 
Later versions introduced health and patient satisfaction 
as desirable outcomes, said to be determined by predis-
posing and enabling factors, behaviours and need. Many 
studies in healthcare, including dentistry, support its 
use.25 26
People may be predisposed to accessing care as a 
result of their demographic factors, social environment 
and beliefs. Enabling factors include policies, facil-
ities, staff finance and the organisation of services that 
might influence utilisation.24 From this perspective, the 
INCENTIVE contract is an enabling factor with policy, 
financial and organisational facets.1 3 19 Health needs may 
include health education, disease prevention, diagnosis, 
treatment, rehabilitation and palliative care. Andersen 
distinguished between evaluated (professionally defined 
or normative) and perceived (personally defined or 
felt) need. In turn, these components could influence 
personal and professional health behaviours. Personal 
behaviours are activities that shape health status, such 
as oral hygiene, diet and tobacco use. Health service use 
is treated as behaviour in itself. Professional behaviours 
relate to processes such as health education, communica-
tion and prescribing. The maintenance and improvement 
of health should be the primary outcome of access, thus 
the outcomes are (patient) perceived and (clinician) eval-
uated health status and patient satisfaction. An important 
feature of the model is its recursive nature with feedback 
loops so that the outcomes of access may influence future 
predisposing and enabling factors, population needs and 
use of services.
Framework analysis was used to induce the results 
from the original accounts within the structured policy 
focus of the research.27 Our intention was to explore the 
effect of the contract as an enabling factor, interacting 
with other stages of the model. While Andersen’s model 
guided the analysis, it was refined as required to identify 
the thematic framework. Data were indexed and charted 
under subheadings derived from the framework to 
enable a process of constant comparison across themes 
and cases. Thus, the framework analysis served to either 
confirm or challenge the model, with deviant case anal-
ysis used to add new categories or revise it. The validity of 
the findings was supported by discussion of interim and 
final results for triangulation and corrections with partic-
ipants in focus groups. The results were also compared 
against existing knowledge, such as the evaluations of the 
NHS Dental Contract Pilots.5
Patient and public involvement
Throughout the research cycle, patient contributors 
worked as integral members of the research team from 
conception of the research idea to shape our research 
questions and aid delivery, project management and 
final data interpretation through to reporting. They 
ensured our research was of relevance to patients and 
the NHS; specifically patient contributors: helped iden-
tify and prioritise the research questions and develop 
the research design (eg, the sampling matrix was co-de-
signed); were members of the study advisory group; and 
co-developed participant information leaflets and dissem-
ination materials.
reSultS
Data were collected between August 2012 and February 
2014. Observations were made of 30 dental appoint-
ments. Eighteen lay people, 15 dental team staff (4 tradi-
tional practice dentists, 8 INCENTIVE dentists, 2 practice 
managers and a dental therapist) and a member of the 
commissioning team took part in the interviews and focus 
groups. The results are presented in two stages. First, the 
major themes in the data are outlined. Second, the inter-
actions between enabling and other factors are described.
Major themes
The Andersen Framework was largely sustained in the 
data, with the only revision being the addition of trust 
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as an outcome of access. Predisposing factors could be 
characterised as demographic and social characteris-
tics and beliefs. For example, family commitment could 
facilitate or hamper service utilisation. Enabling factors 
fell into three subthemes of health policy, finance and 
organisations. The influence of health policy between the 
extremes of the changes associated with implementation 
of the INCENTIVE model right through to an apparent 
lack of policy in some TRADITIONAL practices. A key 
part of the contract was dentists’ remuneration. Tradi-
tional models were problematic for complex cases, 
whereas INCENTIVE practices focused on the costs of 
OHAs and building relationships with patients that would 
enable more prevention. Computing problems featured 
as organisational factors, and in particular the practice 
software, which had not been adapted to INCENTIVE.
Evaluated and environmental need and population 
health indicators were manifest in the data. Two locali-
ties in the study are characterised by material deprivation, 
poor oral health and long-standing undersupply of care. 
Unsurprisingly, this influenced dental treatment needs.
An example of professional behaviour involved formally 
assessing patients’ risk of disease. Dental team members 
commented on the relative imprecision of the traffic light 
(RAG) system and its three categories. Indeed, attitudes 
and practices towards prevention varied appreciably 
among the dental teams, with one dentist noting: I do find 
it hard to talk about their health – I’m trained to drill and fill.
Health outcomes and satisfaction appeared in the data, 
as did the concept of trust. One INCENTIVE patient 
noted: I do trust them here – they treated me, gave me root canal 
treatment and saved my tooth, without them, I’d have been minus 
a few teeth and my appearance would not have been good.
Interactions
The INCENTIVE contract changes the finance and organ-
isation of dental practices to implement health policy. 
Its effects can therefore be seen as interactions between 
these enabling factors and other stages in the model. This 
can be seen in enabling and predisposing factors and 
need. INCENTIVE practices had been located based on 
“a robust oral health needs assessment prior to commissioning 
these practices and we’d looked very closely at equity in terms of 
access to dental care” (Service Commissioner). For some 
participants, the INCENTIVE practices marked a shift 
from no dental care, whereas others moved from private 
to NHS provision. The new services suited participants’ 
needs in terms of location, personnel and ease of getting 
an appointment.
Effects of the INCENTIVE contract were evident on 
the processes of care, personal health practices and the 
use of personal health resources. In turn, the process of 
delivering care appeared to be affected in three ways: (1) 
by the use of the care pathway underpinned by the risk 
assessment/RAG; (2) by increasing prevention communi-
cation and (3) multidisciplinary approach through wider 
use of skill mix. Of interest the communication of the 
RAG ratings was not always apparent in the observations 
and was being used solely by some of the clinicians to 
document progress.
Participants reflected on their experiences with the 
pathways. Benefits included the clear link between the 
risk assessment and care pathways. The INCENTIVE 
contract embedded DHSC guidance26 so that prevention 
became valued standard procedure. Practitioners felt 
that it gave them time and space to care for patients. For 
example, one INCENTIVE dentist noted: Red, amber or 
green and then they do get the fluoride varnish, the smoking cessa-
tion and alcohol use is being taken automatically. This could 
be contrasted directly with the TRADITIONAL practices. 
There was an example of where the focus of care in the 
incentive contract had penetrated a TRADITIONAL 
practice, causing them to reflect on their processes of 
care: We are pushed towards UDAs rather than improving oral 
health… The prevention emphasis is an issue – we are expected 
to talk about perio disease and smoking and diet and have to 
squeeze that in.
The INCENTIVE practices were not mandated to use 
multidisciplinary teams, but did so to deliver preven-
tatively focused care. One approach was for dentists to 
examine patients and formulate treatment plans, but 
some practices did not deduct the value of the delegated 
treatment from dentists’ incomes:
They readily work with each other. I mean our ther-
apist and the hygienist are generally busy the whole 
day, … we pay them on a fixed rate and the therapists 
are very happy with that because they’ve got full time 
work, they’re busy, the associates are happy because 
they’re not having to pay for them …, the patients 
get benefit because they get access to a therapist, … it 
may cost more for us to do it but it’s a more sensible 
way of running a business because everybody is work-
ing together for the same aim.
The new contractual arrangements were seen to influ-
ence personal health practices and the use of personal 
health resources. They also influenced outcomes of 
perceived and evaluated health and patient satisfaction. 
Moreover, the interactions could ripple throughout the 
model to have far-reaching effects. For example, the RAG 
ratings could influence patients’ perceptions of their own 
needs, leading to personal behaviour changes and satis-
faction (an outcome). As one INCENTIVE patient said: I 
think it’s good because if you know, if someone says to you, you 
know on this rating you are more at risk, you’re more likely to do 
something about it aren’t you, as opposed to someone not saying 
anything to you… For dentists, use of the ratings to deter-
mine recall intervals liberated more time for the process 
of care and allowed observation of increased health but 
influenced patient satisfaction both positively and nega-
tively, which suggests a need to reconcile contrasting 
views: the ability to increase access and longer intervals 
between assessments. In a wholly positive example, one 
INCENTIVE patient satisfied with her own care encour-
aged her partner to attend so that professional behaviour 
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enhanced satisfaction to change predisposing factors to 
increase access to care.
DISCuSSIOn
This study has described stakeholders’ views of the 
INCENTIVE contracting arrangements. The ratings 
from OHAs influenced patients’ perceptions of need, 
which led to changes in preventive behaviour. Dentists 
had responded to the contract in the desired direction 
with greater emphasis on prevention, use of the ratings in 
treatment planning, adherence to the pathways and the 
utilisation of skill mix. Participants identified increases 
in the capacity of practices to deliver more care as a 
result. These changes were seen to improve evaluated 
and perceived health and patient satisfaction. Although 
participant numbers were relatively modest, these find-
ings are compatible with the first year evaluations of the 
NHS dental contract pilots where almost three-quarters 
of patients said they had a better understanding of their 
oral health and had changed their behaviour.5 Further-
more, analysis of OHAs and reviews suggested that RAG 
ratings improved for small numbers of patients, within 
2 years.4 Better health and satisfaction increased the 
predisposition to visit the dentist. These findings demon-
strate the potential for a new contract to increase access 
and to improve health.
While these data are encouraging for continued 
contract reform, several areas were identified as requiring 
more consideration, where NHS England, dental teams 
and the public may need more support. The practices 
had been placed in areas of high need. As well as meeting 
immediate needs, the perception of low availability of 
care may also be a barrier to access in areas that have 
been underserved in the past. Evidence of new services 
is therefore needed to break this cycle. The results also 
demonstrate direct benefits of the needs-led local service 
commissioning of the 2006 dental contract.28 29 Such local 
knowledge is less well used in the current NHS England 
single operating model for practice commissioning,30 
which may render the system less responsive.
Participants at INCENTIVE practices reported profes-
sional and lay preventive behaviours leading to better 
evaluated and perceived health. However, there were 
concerns over offering preventive advice, the complexities 
of accounting for the patient’s context, the time this took 
and the difficulties of effective prevention, especially in 
areas with high levels of disease. These aspects of dentistry 
are often presented as problems, sometimes beyond the 
scope of practitioners, rather than part of their job.16 
This is a key issue if dentistry is to refocus on prevention. 
These and other data indicate that change is possible if 
it is encouraged by the right contractual model. Educa-
tion may also be required to support contractual drivers. 
Neither one alone is likely to be sufficient. A Cochrane 
review31 concluded that educational meetings had a small 
effect on professional practice and health outcomes but 
the effects were likely to be smaller still for complex 
behaviours. Both a systematic review of incentives to 
follow best practice in healthcare and a Cochrane review 
of the effect of remuneration on primary care dentists’ 
behaviour cited within it12 32 concluded that financial 
incentives can have a ‘modest’ effect on improving the 
quality of healthcare.
The emphasis on OHAs and pathways was a key feature 
of INCENTIVE and the DHSC contract pilots and subse-
quent prototypes.5 Some patients were not aware of the 
RAG ratings; others perceived them to alert them to their 
preventive needs and to be a motivator. We specifically 
enquired about the RAG ratings when triangulating the 
data in focus groups with dental staff. There was near 
universal use of the ratings as a decision aid (as evident 
in the data), but their use in patient communication 
had decreased over time. Dental teams may need clari-
fication of whether and how the ratings are supposed 
to be communicated to patients. The small number of 
rating categories concerned some dentists, especially 
for patients with immutable risk factors such as general 
health problems. Dentists’ concerns might be alleviated 
by the addition of new categories. Alternatively, they may 
become used to this system and gain confidence in over-
riding the rules of the pathway. Their reluctance to do 
this may stem from the requirement to justify doing so. 
Dentists who engaged in the contract pilots requested 
reassurance about exercising clinical judgement in devi-
ating from recommendations,33 first that there would 
be no medicolegal repercussions provided there was 
evidence of clinical justification; and second, that they 
would not be penalised contractually.
Dental therapists increased the availability of care and 
patient satisfaction. While contract reform is seen to 
play a key role in use of wider dental team skill mix and 
enabling different models of care,34 use of skill mix is 
exquisitely sensitive to contracting and practice finance.35 
Practices had increased their utilisation of wider skill mix 
by not reducing the payments to dentists who delegated 
care. Paying two staff members for the shared treatment 
incentivised referral across the team and also liberated 
dentists’ time for patient OHAs and more remunerative 
complex treatments. The impact of funding arrange-
ments on dental practice is well known, and dentists must 
reconcile the business and other elements of their prac-
tices.36 Dentists could see how the new contract carried 
the potential for greater value for money and reduce 
unnecessary treatment, but there were concerns that the 
time and costs of the OHAs had been underestimated. 
This was also a concern in the dental contract pilots and 
was evident as reduced patient access.33 37 This financial 
risk may be particularly relevant to new practices. The 
pilots were conducted in existing practices and expe-
rienced falls in access. However, the challenges may be 
even more severe in new practices (such as the INCEN-
TIVE practices), where all the patients required initial 
assessments and were more likely to have high treatment 
needs necessitating more visits. This consideration goes 
further than dentists’ incomes as concerns about costs 
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were seen to influence practitioner behaviour. These 
concerns support the notion of assigning contract values 
according to patient needs, which in the contract proto-
types is achieved by weighing the capitation element by 
patient characteristics of age and deprivation status.37
The Andersen model provided a useful taxonomy for 
the data and allowed identification of the effects of the 
new contract. This fit is unsurprising as the model was 
developed over a 40-year period and remains among the 
most widely cited models of access to healthcare.23 24 26 38 
Theoretical models may be tested empirically or by looking 
for logical coherence.39 The Andersen model is some-
what general with overlapping dimensions and others 
(eg, social capital) not explicitly incorporated.26 Very 
little is said about how demographic variables may exert 
effects and why.38 A new factor in these data (‘Trust’) is 
not explicit in the model but could be regarded as both a 
belief and an outcome of care.39 Dimensions also overlap 
in the model where dissimilar concepts are grouped 
together (personal health practices and health service 
use, perceived and evaluated health and satisfaction). 
This is important because empirical testing demands 
careful specification of inclusive relationships and, to a 
certain extent, this confounded testing of this model.38 
One consequence of this might be that the model yields 
very different results when cross national comparisons 
are made.40
COnCluSIOn
The incentive-driven contract influenced access to dental 
care. Participants associated it with more access, greater 
use of skill mix and improved health outcomes. These 
outcomes fed back to shape predispositions to visit the 
dentist.
The policy context in which the INCENTIVE study was 
funded has remained remarkably constant ever since. 
The Steele Report of 20091 advocated commissioning 
to align dentistry with the rest of NHS services and to 
commission for health outcomes; to develop contracts 
rewarding activity, quality and oral health improvement. 
It recommended that payments explicitly recognise 
prevention and reward the contribution of the dental 
team to improvements to oral health, reflected in patient 
progression along the pathway, adherence to clinical 
guidelines and the achievement of expected outcomes.1 
The contract prototypes now being tested37 retain the 
same ethos of shifting NHS dentistry towards prevention 
and oral health rather than treatment and repair through 
a new clinical pathway and new remuneration models. 
Despite predating the Steele report, the INCENTIVE 
contracts were forerunners of these new incentive-driven 
contracts. Thus, our findings remain directly relevant to 
the evolution of the NHS dental contract.
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